Friday, September 30, 2016

In Hacked Fundraiser Recording, Hillary Mocks Bernie Supporters "Living In Their Parents’ Basement"

 

by Tyler Durden

Zero Hedge / 2016-09-30 21:30

The reason why the Trump campaign has been so eager to find transcripts and recordings of the private speeches Hillary Clinton has delivered during her extensive, lucrative speaking career, is because it is there that she reveals that rare glimpse into what she truly thinks, or at least what $250,000 per hour will get her to believe. One such example is a recently hacked recording of Hillary Clinton, where in a private conversation with campaign donors in February, Clinton distanced herself from progressive goals like "free college, free healthcare" and described her place on the political spectrum as spanning from the center-left to the center-right.

The newly disclosed comments first noticed by the Intercept, came in audio from hacked emails revealed this week by the Washington Free Beacon. Clinton was speaking at a Virginia fundraiser hosted by Beatrice Welters, the former U.S. ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago, and her husband Anthony Welters, the executive chairman of an investment consulting firm founded by former Clinton aid Cheryl Mills.

The hacked audio provides another peek into the ideological chameleon that Hillary is on a day to day basis. As the Intercept notes, "Clinton has been inconsistent in the past about espousing political labels. She has at times touted herself as stalwart liberal. For instance, she said last July: "I take a backseat to no one when you look at my record in standing up and fighting for progressive values." But a few months later, she told a group in Ohio: "You know, I get accused of being kind of moderate and center. I plead guilty."

In one segment of the leaked audio, Hillary focused on her opponent at the time, Bernie Sanders, was pointed to successful programs in Scandinavia which provide universal daycare, family leave, and government sponsored healthcare and college education, as policies that he would seek to adopt. "Progressive" Hillary mocked the compared idea of "free college, free healthcare" to the "extreme" ideas promulgated by the right, which include "populism, nationalism and xenophobia."

It is important to recognize what's going on in this election. Everybody who's ever been in an election that I'm aware of is quite bewildered because there is a strain of, on the one hand, the kind of populist, nationalist, xenophobic, discriminatory kind of approach that we hear too much of from the Republican candidates. And on the other side, there's just a deep desire to believe that we can have free college, free healthcare, that what we've done hasn't gone far enough, and that we just need to, you know,  go as far as, you know, Scandinavia, whatever that means, and half the people don't know what that means, but it's something that they deeply feel. So as a friend of mine said the other day, I am occupying from the center-left to the center-right. And I don't have much company there. Because it is difficult when you're running to be president, and you understand how hard the job is —  I don't want to overpromise. I don't want to tell people things that I know we cannot do.

Recording below::

 

Clinton then went on to explain why she felt so many Democratic voters, many of whom "live in their parents' basement" were gravitating to Sanders. Ironically, for a presidential candidate that touts the economic recovery the US is going through, she admits these "children of the Great Recession" don't see much of a future...

Some are new to politics completely. They're children of the Great Recession. And they are living in their parents' basement. They feel they got their education and the jobs that are available to them are not at all what they envisioned for themselves. And they don't see much of a future.

... and with an entire generation unexpectedly finding itself in a dead-end economy, it provides a perfect incubator for what according to Hillary is an army of Bernie supporters: "if you're feeling like you're consigned to, you know, being a barista... then the idea that maybe, just maybe, you could be part of a political revolution is pretty appealing."

I met with a group of young black millennials today and you know one of the young women said, "You know, none of us feel that we have the job that we should have gotten out of college. And we don't believe the job market is going to give us much of a chance." So that is a mindset that is really affecting their politics. And so if you're feeling like you're consigned to, you know, being a barista, or you know, some other job that doesn't pay a lot, and doesn't have some other ladder of opportunity attached to it, then the idea that maybe, just maybe, you could be part of a political revolution is pretty appealing

One wonders whose fault it is that millions of young people are stuck in dead end jobs, living in their parents basement, while both Obama and Hillary make TV appearances touting the strength of the economic recovery.

But the punchline was what Hillary, who has been scrambling to secure the much-needed Millennial vote in recent weeks, truly thought about about the millions of young people whose vote she is trying to win: a diatribe of mockery, in which she describes the concept of a political revolution as a "false promise" which has attracted all these disillusioned and disheartened young people "living in their parents' basement." Does Hillary have anything to offer them? No, but she desperately needs their vote, even if behind the scenes at generously paid private functions, she mocks them in front of all those present.

We should all be really understanding of that and should try to do the best we can not to be, you know, a wet blanket on idealism. We want people to be idealistic. We want them to set big goals... But those of us who understand this, who've worked in it know that it's a false promise. But I don't think you tell idealistic people, particularly young people that they've bought into a false promise.

Especially when you are trying to secure their votes?

Then again, considering the eagerness with which Bernie Sanders has endorsed Wall Street's favorite candidate, it is quite clear that the real "false promise" here was Sanders' "revolution" all along.  We wonder if in light of this hack, if Bernie Sanders would care to make some statement why he is endosing the candidate who behind closed doors, openly mocks everything that his supporters believe in.

Clinton has been accused numerous times in the past of patronizing young Sanders supporters. On Meet The Press in April, Clinton said she said "I feel sorry sometimes for the young people" who believe Sanders's claims about her taking money from the fossil fuel industry.

During her remarks, she reiterated her belief that politics is the art of the possible, dismissing the more aspirational approach of Sanders and his supporters. "I want to be very clear about the progress I think we can make," she said. There was no discussion of her view that the ideology of millions of progressive, young people is a false promise.

And while America's young voters will be given an opportunity to respond to Hillary in just over 5 weeks time, one wonders what, in a world where Donald Trump's every word is brutally attacked by the pro-Clinton media. would emerge if even a handful of Hillary's Wall Street speech transcripts were the finally emerge.

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

So You Want to Terraform Mars?

 

by Caleb A. Scharf

In the rather epic video that accompanies the recent SpaceX vision for interplanetary travel and colonization, it's the last few seconds that are perhaps the most intriguing. As the planet Mars spins on its axis we're given a peek into a future where this dry, cold, dusty world starts to transform into a place of a different hue, with standing water and perhaps a hint of green.

The idea of re-engineering a planet - terraforming it - is not new, and not for the faint-of-heart. But given the audacity and success of many of Elon Musk's projects, the notion that we might alter Mars to better suit us is at least worth some reconsideration. 

Terraforming is one item in a long list of ways in which humans might persist on a world that, in all other respects, appears to exist for the sole purpose of killing us. If you don't die en-route, on landing, or from sheer psychological stress, you'll die from exposure to low pressure, extreme temperatures, UV radiation, cosmic rays, corrosive martian regolith (laced with perchlorates), starvation, long-term low gravity, or stuff we just haven't thought of yet. 

There is also the sticky question of what you do to protect any indigenous life on Mars. Do rock-eating microbes have rights? They would certainly have a scientific value that is hard to overstate, and plopping thousands of filthy apes on the surface of an otherwise pristine natural environment would probably be the worst possible thing to do. I won't tackle this here - but it's a key question.

Before we jump all the way to terraforming, there are potential intermediate steps to mitigate the hazards of life on Mars for large numbers of people. You can certainly build habitable structures - perhaps buried in regolith to help with insulation and radiation protection. You might even start to build 'biodome' type facilities where you effectively make a little Earth in a bubble. These are sometimes termed 'para-terraforming' approaches. But you probably want to start figuring out how to exploit the land itself.

One idea is canyon-tenting. Mars has landforms like canyons, craters, or lava-tubes that might only need a 'lid' structure to create a vast volume of environment where we could introduce atmosphere, moisture, and have control. 

The ultimate living off the land though is partial to full terraforming. So how do you do that?

The first step would be to try to add density to the martian atmosphere - currently a lung-emptying 1/1000th of an Earth atmosphere in pressure. A thicker atmosphere and higher temperature could allow liquid water on the surface - sourced from large martian frozen water deposits.

Mars does have huge deposits of frozen carbon dioxide towards its polar regions, releasing that as gas could have a twofold benefit: boosting atmospheric pressure and boosting the global retention of infrared radiation - the 'greenhouse' effect. At present the martian atmosphere is significantly less opaque to infrared (IR) radiation than the Earth's - an IR 'optical depth' (a statistical measure of how efficiently light gets stopped) for modern Mars is about 0.2 compared to Earth's 0.83 - Venus is about 60. 

If we could release most of the frozen carbon dioxide on Mars we'd be able to raise atmospheric pressure to about 1/3rd that of the Earth and get to a runaway point where the polar temperature is permanently over the sublimation point - preventing CO2 ice from forming again. To do this we have options like:

  • lots and lots of thermonuclear explosions above the poles (an approach Elon Musk has mentioned, at least informally)
  • giant mirrors in space to focus solar power onto the polar regions (a 125 km radius mirror could help raise polar temperatures by around 5 Kelvin).
  • dumping ammonia into atmosphere as a greenhouse gas by dropping cometary (icy) bodies. Has advantage of also adding a 'buffer' of nitrogen gas to the martian atmosphere.
  • pumping CFC's into the atmosphere to boost the greenhouse effect - needs about 40 million tons (about 3 times the total CFC production ever manufactured by humans to date).
  • spray paint the martian surface to be less reflective (would take a long time to have an effect)

...and these are just the first steps.

The list of potential showstoppers is equally long:

  • climate is complex. Would we just make Mars a world of storms and uselessly extreme climate zones?
  • you might not explode in the low pressure anymore, but what about oxygen? It could take centuries to build a breathable atmosphere.
  • we probably don't understand well enough how Mars would lose elements to space - once water vapor is abundant it's going to start breaking up via photodissociation in the upper atmosphere where the hydrogen can be lost permanently. Would we actually dry up Mars?
  • Mars is far less geophysically active than Earth, has no plate tectonics. For longer term climate stability this could be key. In other words, we might make Mars habitable for a few thousand years and no longer.
  • Earth is literally alive with microbes of vast genetic diversity, permeating the rocks, interleaved with geochemistry. Can we seed Mars in a way that reproduces the systems that help keep Earth the way it was when it produced us?

It's clear that the answers are not going to be simple. The SpaceX vision is a wonderfully provocative and stimulating counterpoint to the last few decades of limited human spaceflight. It also resonates with the concerns any rational person has about the existential crises that face any species living on a planet (not just self-inflicted crises either). Like any vision it's a starting point. 

There is another intriguing side to all of this. We've undertaken an uncontrolled experiment on Earth since the industrial revolution. Would a controlled experiment on Mars offer us insight to all worlds and all possible human futures?

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and are not necessarily those of Scientific American.

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

Read How Chicago Police Use Asset Forfeiture as a Slush-Fund for Surveillance Equipment

 

by C.J. Ciaramella

Reason.com Full Feed / 2016-09-30 14:35

One of the most aggravating aspects of civil asset forfeiture for anyone trying to study the subtle beast is just how little information is public about how much property police departments seize, who they seize it from, and where all that revenue goes.

Enter the Chicago Reader, which in an investigation published Thursday painstakingly pieced together how the Chicago Police Department's narcotics unit uses civil forfeiture to create "what amounts to a secret budget—an off-the-books stream of income used to supplement the bureau's public budget."

According to the Reader, the CPD has seized a whopping $72 million in cash and property since 2009 using civil forfeiture, and used some of that money—without any form of public oversight—to purchase controversial surveillance equipment like cell-phone tracking devices.

Among the people caught in the civil forfeiture dragnet was 72-year-old Willie Mae Swansey, whose PT Cruiser was seized by the CPD after her son was caught driving it with 50 to 100 grams of heroin on him.

I filed a couple of the numerous public records requests involved in this investigation and found CPD using seized cars for undercover operations, but read the Reader to see how it all fits together:

The Reader has documented for the first time the full size and scope of CPD's civil forfeiture program—how much money it brings in and how it spends its take. Through numerous Freedom of Information Act requests, the Reader, working with the Chicago-based transparency nonprofit Lucy Parsons Labs and the public records website MuckRock, obtained more than 1,000 pages of CPD documents—including the department's deposit and expenditure ledgers, internal e-mails, and purchasing records—that offer an unprecedented look into how Chicago police and the Cook County state's attorney's office make lucrative use of civil asset forfeiture.

Since 2009, the year CPD began keeping electronic records of its forfeiture accounts, the department has brought in nearly $72 million in cash and assets through civil forfeiture, keeping nearly $47 million for itself and sending on almost $18 million to the Cook County state's attorney's office and almost $7.2 million to the Illinois State Police, according to our analysis of CPD records [...]

The Reader found that CPD uses civil forfeiture funds to finance many of the day-to-day operations of its narcotics unit and to secretly purchase controversial surveillance equipment without public scrutiny or City Council oversight. (The Cook County state's attorney's office, for its part, clearly indicates narcotics-related forfeiture income in its annual budget. According to its 2016 budget, the office will use this year's expected forfeiture revenue of $4.96 million to pay the salaries and benefits of the 41 full-time employees of its forfeiture unit.)

As I reported earlier this summer, the state of Illinois seized $72 million over the past couple of years, according to state police documents obtained by the Illinois ACLU through public records requests:

The list is full of digital scales, money counters, safes and guns (including AR-style rifles and shotguns). Among the seized vehicles are no less than six Cadillac Escalades, six Mercedes-Benz sedans, and a 2013 Triumph Bonneville Steve McQueen Edition motorcycle.

Electronics are an especially popular target for seizures by law enforcement, and the Illinois police are no different: Flatscreen TVs, especially of the 50" and above variety, were common items, along with smart phones, iPads, digital cameras, laptops and video game systems, and Beats by Dre.

But while the documents shed some rare light on asset forfeiture in the state, it didn't tell us, for example, whether the seizures were under civil or criminal procedure, or under what law the assets were seized.

The Institute for Justice, a libertarian public-interest law firm, gave the state's asset forfeiture laws a "D-" grade for their lax property owner protections, low standards of evidence and expensive bond requirements to challenge seizures.

"Illinois' reporting is better than some states in that they actually have reporting, but it's far, far away from what we believe should be required," Dick Carpenter, director for strategic research at the Institute for Justice, told me. "This is exactly the type of info we think should be reported to the public, but it's very rare that any state collects this or makes it available."

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

Ala. Chief Justice Roy Moore Suspended For Rest Of Term Over Gay Marriage Stance

 

/ 2016-09-30 16:57

Enlarge this image

Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, seen here addressing the media in August, won't be paid for the rest of his term and must pay court costs. Brynn Anderson/AP hide caption

toggle caption
Brynn Anderson/AP

Saying that Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore violated judicial ethics when he ordered judges not to respect the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark ruling on same-sex marriage, Alabama's Court of the Judiciary suspended Moore for the rest of his term in office.

The order also requires the head of Alabama's highest court to pay the costs of the proceedings against him and stipulates that he will not be paid for the remainder of his six-year term.

Alabama's next election for the chief justice post is scheduled for 2018.

"After his term though, Moore's age will disqualify him from running for judge," notes Alabama Public Radio, which adds that Moore could file an appeal to send his case to the state's supreme court.

The judgment against Moore was unanimous. But the nine-member court also noted that the decision is based on a review of Moore's behavior and decisions, not on the justices' views of the Supreme Court's June 2015 ruling that same-sex couples have the right to marry — contrary to Alabama's law, adopted in 2016, that had reserved marriage for heterosexual couples only.

Saying that "some members of this court did not personally agree with" the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling, the judges wrote, "This court simply does not have the authority to reexamine those issues."

Here's how NPR's Debbie Elliott laid out the case against Moore, when it began earlier this week:

"Moore forced the debate last year when he issued orders in conflict with a Mobile, Ala., federal judge's ruling that struck down the state's ban on same-sex marriage. Here's what he told NPR at the time:

" 'If we sit back and let the federal courts intrude their powers into state sovereignty, then we're neglecting everything about which the Constitution stands,' Moore said.

"The result was confusion in marriage license offices throughout Alabama. Some closed down altogether. Even after the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed marriage equality, Moore told local judges that they had a 'ministerial duty not to issue any marriage license contrary to' state laws forbidding same-sex marriage."

For Moore, this is the second high-profile dispute that has cut short his term leading the Alabama Supreme Court. In 2003, he was removed from office after refusing a federal court's order to remove a prominent display of the Ten Commandments from the state judicial building. Alabama voters elected him to the office again in 2012.

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPhone

The DEA's Decision to Keep Pot Restrictions Perpetuates Hypocrisy

 

by Carl Hart

In early August the Drug Enforcement Administration declined to reclassify marijuana under the federal Controlled Substances Act. The drug is currently listed on Schedule I, meaning that it is viewed as having "no currently accepted medical use in treatment" and is therefore technically banned by federal law. The proposed change would have moved it to Schedule II, where it would join morphine, opium and codeine. That would make marijuana potentially available by prescription nationwide. Such a change would have been good for patients and scientists, and it would have represented a big step toward resolving the hypocritical mess that characterizes current law.

Despite many people's assumptions to the contrary, the existing law does not ban scientific investigation into the harms and benefits of the drug. It's true that scientists studying marijuana must jump through multiple bureaucratic and regulatory hoops, and one of these just became a bit easier to navigate. Currently researchers who want to study the drug must get it from the University of Mississippi, which is the only university now permitted to grow marijuana plants for research purposes. When the DEA announced in August that it would not reschedule marijuana, it did say that it would let other institutions apply for permission to start growing the plants as well. That was a step in the right direction—but it's not enough.

Despite the regulatory barriers, dozens of scientists—myself included—have been engaged in research on the harms and benefits of marijuana for decades, and the evidence shows that the drug has many helpful therapeutic uses. For example, it stimulates appetite in HIV-positive patients, which could be a lifesaver for someone suffering from AIDS wasting syndrome. It is also useful in the treatment of neuropathic pain, chronic pain, and spasticity caused by multiple sclerosis.

Therapeutic benefits such as these have compelled citizens to vote repeatedly, over the past two decades, to legalize medical marijuana at the state level. Today 25 states and the District of Columbia allow patients to take the drug for specific conditions. And yet federal law still technically forbids the use of medical marijuana. The inconsistency of federal law with reality at the state level—and with the growing body of research demonstrating the benefits of the substance—makes marijuana's Schedule I status seem like medical and bureaucratic hypocrisy.

There is now a general sentiment among scientists that the failed war on drugs has biased the DEA against acknowledging any therapeutic potential for marijuana. The petition to reschedule the substance that the agency responded to this past summer was five years old. It is hard to avoid the impression that DEA leadership was stalling, hoping that the public would simply forget about the issue. Last year DEA acting administrator Chuck Rosenberg described the very concept of medical marijuana as "a joke."

Perhaps it's also a joke that a law-enforcement agency has the final word on a medical issue.

As a scientist and educator, I am worried that our illogical, unscientific scheduling of marijuana is costing us credibility with young people and with those seeking treatments for a variety of conditions. I am further concerned that people most in need of our help and advice will reject other drug-related information from "official" sources, even when it is accurate. And when patients reject official advice and proved medicine, they become more susceptible to quackery. It's time we lessened the outsized influence of a law-enforcement agency on medical decisions and started to rebuild our credibility as scientists on the issue of marijuana.

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPhone

Cops Dodge 4th Amendment By Phoning In 'Anonymous' Tips; Watch Their Drug Bust Vanish After They're Exposed

 

by Tim Cushing

Techdirt. / 2016-09-30 01:38

Really. What the hell? Does law enforcement just perceive the Fourth Amendment as damage and route around it?

Detective Harold Zech and Lawrence Spathelf didn't have probable cause to search the homes of Albert McCullough and Dakeem Booker, so they made their own. They phoned in "anonymous" tips to McCullough's and Booker's parole officers, who searched their [homes] and found some heroin.

It's not as though the Fourth Amendment is that difficult to comply with, especially considering law enforcement can avail themselves of all of the following to avoid having to obtain a warrant:

- Good faith exception

- Exigent circumstances

- Motor vehicle exception

- Plain view

- Plain hearing

- Plain smell

- Consent

And yet here we are, seeing two cops masquerading as the most reliable and honest of anonymous tipsters. You know, except for the part where they covered up the fact that they were cops.

The bust was fun while it lasted. 963 bags of heroin, two handguns, and a couple of perps. None of that matters now because the Fourth Amendment was just too much of a hassle.

This sort of dishonesty has happened often enough that there's a term for it.

[T]he law is clear that police cannot use parole agents as an arm of law enforcement to initiate a search to get around the stricter probable cause standard they must meet, Mr. Sheppard and other attorneys said. Multiple appellate courts ruled that practice, known as a "stalking horse," illegal.

The two horses called in tips twice, resulting in searches of two residences. Despite costing them a nice drug bust and successful prosecution, both the DA (Shane Scanlon) and the Chief of Police (Carl Graziano) are defending not only the faux tipsters' actions, but their work as law enforcement officers as well.

"Do I think in any way, shape or form this was an effort to be dishonest or an intentional act? I don't," Mr. Scanlon said. "I think it was an attempt to comply with the stalking horse law that was just done wrong."

Hmm. "I tried to comply with the speed limit but did it wrong." "I tried to comply with restrictions on the distribution of Schedule 1 substances but somehow screwed it up. Am I free to go?"

Yes, the officers did exactly the opposite of what the law forbids. That is indeed "wrong." But to shrug off the deliberate nature of their actions is asinine. The pair never identified themselves as law enforcement officers which means they knew they were violating something, even if they were unclear on the legal specifics. There was no "effort to comply." Just dishonesty and the hope that the ends would justify the means, as the police chief inadvertently implies in his defense of his employee.

"His goals and intentions, along with all other members of the Scranton Police Department, is to remove violent criminals and drug traffickers from the streets of Scranton while at the same time staying within the lines of current case laws and acceptable procedures," Chief Graziano said in an email.

There was no "staying in the lines" here. Just two officers wandering outside of the confines of the law to expedite a process that likely could have been handled in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. It may have required more time and effort, but certainly wasn't an impossibility.

Citizens may not be pleased that two drug dealers will go unpunished. But they should be equally displeased the two officers who undid these convictions haven't even suffered the brief indignity of a paid vacation for their actions. As civil rights attorney Barry Dyller points out, this tells other law enforcement officers that there are zero consequences for bending the rules.

"The commonwealth and DA have a duty not merely to convict, but a duty to seek justice," Mr. Dyller said. "If there is no consequence for those officers, it's a signal to other officers it's not the end of the world if you cut corners. ... For every time someone is caught, there has to be 100 times when they are not."

Then there's this depressing statement from the DA, which clearly shows how much faith and deference his office extends to law enforcement.

Mr. Scanlon said as far as he knows, Mr. Booker's and Mr. McCullough's cases are the only two where this has happened. He acknowledged he has not done any research to determine if there are other cases.

Chances are, Scanlon still has yet to do any research. Why go looking for information that might disprove your bold, unresearched statements? Why give the other side that much more ammo when defending the accused? Better to stay on this side of the blue line and avoid biting the hand that feeds you criminal cases.



Permalink | Comments | Email This Story
--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

Thursday, September 29, 2016

So Brave: This University of Michigan Kid Selected ‘His Majesty’ as Personal Pronoun

 

by Robby Soave

Reason.com Full Feed / 2016-09-29 16:58

KingA student has taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by University of Michigan's new pronoun policy, which allows students to list their chosen pronouns on the official bios that are sent out to their teachers.

The student, Grant Stroble, has listed his pronoun as "His Majesty."

He is stunning and brave. Applaud his courage. Weep openly, if you must.

Are you finished? Still reading? It's quite a moving story, I know.

Stroble's heroism will no doubt be celebrated by the university, which recently gave students the option of selecting their own pronouns in order to foster "an environment of inclusiveness." According to the university:

Students can designate pronouns in Wolverine Access through the new Gender Identity tab within the Campus Personal Information section. This page can be used to enter, update or delete pronoun information.

Designated pronouns will automatically populate on all class rosters accessed through Wolverine Access. Rosters pulled from other systems will not have designated pronouns listed. If a student does not designate a pronoun, none will be listed.

In other words, when professors receive the list of students enrolled in their classes, there will be a designated pronoun next to their names. Strobles's is "His Majesty."

Stroble—a conservative student and member of Young Americans for Freedom's Board of Governors—told The College Fix that he has no problem with students asking to be identified in the manner that makes them most comfortable. But he found the university's new policy to be absurd:

In an interview with The College Fix, Strobl said that "I have no problem with students asking to be identified a certain way, almost like someone named Richard who would like to be called Dick. It is respectful to make a reasonable effort to refer to students in the way that they prefer."

However, he added that he does have a problem when the university institutionalizes the use of pronouns that are completely arbitrary and may possibly sanction people for referring to someone different than their preference.

Strobl continued, "So, I henceforth shall be referred to as: His Majesty, Grant Strobl. I encourage all U-M students to go onto Wolverine Access, and insert the identity of their dreams."

If this isn't the feel-good story of the year, I don't know what is.

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

Stocks Are Crashing - Led By Banks

 The beginning of an October crash?

by Tyler Durden

Zero Hedge / 2016-09-29 12:12

Contagion?

Deutsche Bank crash -> US Financials plunge -> US Stocks tumble...

20160929_stocks_0.jpg

 

And it's weighing on all indices...

20160929_stocks2_0.jpg

 

Bonds & Bullion are bid as financials lead stocks lower...

20160929_stocks3_0.jpg

 

And for those believing that there is no contagion and this is all ring-fenced...

DB%20IMF%201_0.jpg

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

[Eugene Volokh] Supreme Court’s new First Amendment price advertising case — can law allow ‘cash discounts’ but forbid ‘credit card surcharges’?

 The idiocy of government.

by Eugene Volokh

The Volokh Conspiracy / 2016-09-29 11:06

(Mike Blake/Reuters)

The Supreme Court just agreed to hear Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, a very interesting First Amendment case. Here's how the question is framed in a friend-of-the-court brief filed by Mahesha P. Subbaraman (with the help of Prof. Jane Bambauer) on behalf of several First Amendment law professors, including me:

Imagine an electronics store in New York needs to recoup $100 on the sale of a television. If the store owner labels the television with a sticker price of "$100 plus $2 for credit card sales" or "$102, which includes $2 for credit card sales," the owner risks jail time. But if the label reads "$102, with a $2 discount for cash sales," the store owner is in the clear.

Ultimately, that is what this case is about: the criminalization of truthful commercial speech. New York has enacted a law that prohibits sellers from announcing a surcharge for credit-card sales. This surcharge ban does not mean, however, that sellers must charge identical prices for credit-card sales and cash sales. Instead, New York enforces its surcharge ban by instructing sellers to inflate their normal sticker prices and then announce "discounts" from these prices for cash sales. Sellers must then tread carefully in explaining this situation to inquiring customers in order to avoid referring to a surcharge and thus committing a crime. See id. The most sellers can disclose is a half-truth: that their sticker prices do not apply to those who pay with cash.

The petitioners here, several New York sellers, have challenged this state of affairs as a violation of their free speech rights under the First Amendment. The Second Circuit, however, found that New York's enforcement of its surcharge ban did not curb speech at all and instead merely regulated economic conduct in terms of how sellers may set their sticker prices.

The amici respectfully submit that the Court should grant certiorari in this case. This Court has consistently affirmed that the First Amendment protects "the consumer's interest in the free flow of truthful commercial information" — especially when it comes to truthful information about prices.

The decision below stands in direct conflict with this principle. Under the Second Circuit's view, so long as a law is dressed up as a regulation of economic conduct, there is no place at all for First Amendment inquiry even if the law's main purpose or effect is to restrict the free flow of truthful commercial information about prices to consumers. And that is what New York's surcharge ban achieves by presenting sellers with a Hobson's choice: either announce sticker prices that keep people in the dark about the extra costs of credit-card processing, or announce sticker prices that disaggregate these costs for the consumer at the risk of fines and jail time.

This Court should therefore grant review to clarify when laws or policies that purport to regulate economic conduct still merit scrutiny under the First Amendment and its protection of commercial speech. Such clarification is vital not only to resolve a circuit split on the kind of surcharge ban that is at issue in this case but also to preserve the First Amendment's status as a bulwark against government attempts to suppress truthful commercial information.

Lower courts have split on this question; a similar issue can also arises as to restrictions on how sellers can describe taxes:

Little imagination is necessary to conceive of the myriad ways in which this rule may be abused to the detriment of free speech — and not just commercial speech. Consider a town council that decides to impose a "soda tax" to combat public obesity but also seeks to stifle criticism of this policy from grocers, soda manufacturers, and members of the public. The council therefore passes a law requiring all grocers to incorporate this tax into sticker prices for soda. As a result, under this law, the first sales invoice below is unlawful while the second sales invoice is lawful:

Unlawful Sales Invoice
12-oz soda $1.00
Soda tax $2.00
Total $3.00

Lawful Sales Invoice
12-oz soda $3.00
Total $3.00

Both invoices put customers on notice about the total amount they will pay. The difference is in how the underlying prices are expressed, how they are framed, and how they are likely to be perceived. There also can be no question that any effort by the government to stifle expression about taxation would implicate the First Amendment's core protection of political speech. Yet, under the Second Circuit's logic here, any grocer who objects to the town council's new law has no First Amendment claim because all the law appears to do is regulate the conduct of tax collection.

This is not a theoretical problem, as the state of Kentucky has proven. Kentucky tried to ban telecom providers from listing a new telecom tax on customer bills. See BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Farris, 542 F.3d 499, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit correctly found, in turn, that the First Amendment applied to this ban as Kentucky had "no objection to the [telecom] providers' conduct (raising prices to account for the new tax), just [the providers'] speech (saying why [they] ha[ve] raised prices)."

Finally, let me stress again that the question is not whether the government can require the same prices for credit card and cash transactions (thus banning credit card surcharges or cash discounts altogether). That it can do, because that would be a purely economic regulation: The government would be restricting what price could be charged.

Rather, the question is whether the government can forbid describing a perfectly lawful transaction ($100 cash, $102 credit) in one accurate way ("$100 cash, or $2 more if you use a credit card") but allow the same transaction described a different way ("$102, or $2 less if you use cash").

For more, see Jane Bambauer's much more detailed blog post, written when the amicus brief was filed.

mainfeed?d=yIl2AUoC8zA mainfeed?d=qj6IDK7rITs
--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

[Orin Kerr] Probable cause and cellphone searches

 

by Orin Kerr

The Volokh Conspiracy / 2016-09-29 10:36

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has handed down a new case, Commonwealth v. White, that considers this question: When the police have strong reason to believe that a suspect committed a conspiracy crime, and they know the suspect has a cellphone, what showing must they make to establish probable cause that there is evidence of the crime on the phone? The court ruled that there needs to be specific reason to think there is specific evidence on the phone, and that generalized police experience that conspirators have evidence of their crimes on their phones isn't enough.

I'm not sure the court is right, so I thought I would explain the case and why I'm not entirely persuaded by its reasoning.

The facts of the case are simple. In 2010, three men robbed a convenience store and shot and killed the store clerk. White was a a 16-year-old high school student at the time. The day after the robbery, White confessed to his mother that he was one of the robbers. White's mom contacted the police, and the police searched her home and White's grandmother's house (where White lived) and found clothing that appeared similar to that seen at the crime and at an earlier similar robbery.

The police then seized White's cellphone. The phone is described as a "pay-as-you-go Samsung/Sprint cellular telephone." The crime occurred in February 2010, so presumably the phone was from anywhere from a 2010 model to (more likely) a somewhat earlier model. A footnote tells us that the phone "appears to have had various capabilities associated with modern computers, including the ability to do the following: browse the Internet and keep a log of sites visited; send, receive, and store electronic mail messages; support instant messaging; create an address book and calendar; and take and store photographs." However, the opinion also says the phone "does not appear to have all the capabilities of an upmarket 'smart phone.'"

When the police searched the phone, they found a photograph of the loot that White had stolen in another similar robbery he had participated in around the same time as the robbery investigated in this case. The police want to use the photograph in their case against White.

For reasons I won't bore you with, the legal question now is whether the police had probable cause based on the facts at the time they took the phone that there was evidence of crime on the phone.

In a 4-0 opinion by Justice Barbara Lenk, the SJC ruled that the police lacked probable cause because they did not establish a reason to think there was particularized evidence of the robbery on the phone. That is, they didn't show a specific nexus between the crime and the phone:

[To have probable cause,] police first must obtain information that establishes the existence of some "particularized evidence" related to the crime. Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 502 (2016). Only then, if police believe, based on training or experience, that this "particularized evidence" is likely to be found on the device in question, do they have probable cause to seize or search the device in pursuit of that evidence. Id. at 498, 503 (police knew that defendant had been "receiving threatening [tele]phone calls and threatening text messages on his [tele]phone"; probable cause to search telephone for that "particularized evidence").

They did not have that information in this case, the court rules:

"Information establishing that a person [may be] guilty of a crime does not necessarily constitute probable cause to search" or seize the person's cellular telephone, even where the police believe, based on their training and experience in similar cases, that the device is likely to contain relevant evidence (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 441 (2009). Rather, even where there is probable cause to suspect the defendant of a crime, police may not seize or search his or her cellular telephone to look for evidence unless they have information establishing the existence of particularized evidence likely to be found there.

The Commonwealth argues, however, that the detectives possessed the functional equivalent of such information in the form of the commonsense notion that "cellular telephones are . . . necessary to social interactions." See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 245-246 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015). On this basis, police inferred that, if the defendant planned and committed multiple crimes with two coventurers, it was likely he did so, at least in part, using his cellular telephone, and that evidence of these communications would be found on the device.

It may well be the case that "many of [those] . . . who own a cell phone [in effect] keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives," including, presumably, communications with their coventurers. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). Nonetheless, the Commonwealth's argument is unavailing. While probable cause may be based in part on police expertise or on "the practical considerations of everyday life," see Kaupp, 453 Mass. at 111, such considerations do "not, alone, furnish the requisite nexus between the criminal activity and the places to be searched" or seized. Anthony, 451 Mass. at 72. See Pina, 453 Mass. at 441-442 (officer's practical experience insufficient basis for probable cause where no "particularized information").

Moreover, the argument simply "proves too much." See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480 (1971) (rejecting Fourth Amendment argument that would sweep too broadly). In essence, the Commonwealth is suggesting that there exists a nexus between a suspect's criminal acts and his or her cellular telephone whenever there is probable cause that the suspect was involved in an offense, accompanied by an officer's averment that, given the type of crime under investigation, the device likely would contain evidence. If this were sufficient, however, it would be a rare case where probable cause to charge someone with a crime would not open the person's cellular telephone to seizure and subsequent search. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (only "inexperienced or unimaginative law enforcement officer . . . could not come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell phone"). We cannot accept such a result, which is inconsistent with our admonition that "individuals have significant privacy interests at stake in their [cellular telephones] and that the probable cause requirement . . . under both the Fourth Amendment . . . and art. 14 . . . [must] serve[] to protect these interests." See Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502 n.11.

In a footnote, the court adds:

These interests exist even where, as here, the device does not appear to have all the capabilities of an upmarket "smart phone." Were the device to possess the enhanced capabilities of a "smart phone," that would merely implicate even greater privacy concerns.

The court concludes:

The detectives here lacked any information establishing the existence of evidence likely to be found on the defendant's cellular telephone. We conclude, accordingly, that they lacked the nexus required for probable cause to seize that device. Lacking probable cause, the seizure was by definition improper, and we need not address whether there were exigent circumstances justifying the decision to do so without a warrant.

Maybe some of this is based on Massachusetts law specifically. But to the extent it's about the Fourth Amendment, I'm not sure this is right.

Here's my thinking: First, the evidence was quite strong that White had committed the robbery together with two other people. My intuition is that when a mom calls the police saying that her teenage son confessed to committing a robbery yesterday, it's pretty likely he did it. Second, in 2010, most teenagers had cellphones and used them constantly. According to a 2010 Pew study, three-quarters of 12-to-17-year-olds owned cellphones, and half used them to send at least 50 text messages a day. Phones of that vintage would keep records of the texts, the pictures, phone calls and the like. Given this, I would think the odds are pretty good that a teenager who committed a robbery with two other people and who then confessed about the crime to his mother would have some evidence of the crime somewhere on the phone shortly after the crime occurred.

Are those "pretty good" odds good enough to establish to probable cause? Off the top of my head, it seems like a relatively close call. But without taking a clear position on either side, I'm not particularly convinced by the SJC's argument that probable cause was lacking.

The SJC ruled that there was no probable cause because the officers lacked a specific reason to know a specific file or kind of file was on the phone. But I'm not sure that "particularized evidence" is required to establish probable cause. First, the requirement of particularized evidence comes from caselaw on the particularity requirement of the warrant clause. It's not clear it relates at all to the nexus between the crime and the phone, which is about probable cause instead of particularity.

Second, there's lots of Fourth Amendment caselaw in which a generalized conclusion about certain kinds of crimes has been deemed sufficient to create probable cause to search particular property. Consider the cases in which the government establishes that a suspect is an active drug dealer and then seeks a warrant based on probable cause to search the suspect's house. Courts have not demanded specific reason to think specific evidence is inside the house. Rather, the understanding is that active drug dealers need a place to put contraband and instrumentalities of crime, and that in general at least some of that is likely to be in the home. Probable cause to believe the person is a drug dealer establishes probable cause to search the person's home for contraband and the usual instrumentalities of drug dealing.

As Judge Hartz wrote for the 10th Circuit in United States. v. Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2009):

[W]e think it merely common sense that a drug supplier will keep evidence of his crimes at his home. In United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 689–90 (10th Cir.2002), we said that when police officers have probable cause to believe that a suspect is involved in drug distribution, there is also probable cause to believe that additional evidence of drug-trafficking crimes (such as drug paraphernalia or sales records) will be found in his residence. A leading treatise notes our decision in Sparks as among those in which courts have not required particular facts to support the inference that a drug trafficker keeps his supply at his residence. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(d), at 421–22 n. 170 (4th ed.2004); cf. id. at 421–22 ("[I]t is commonly held that this gap can be filled merely on the basis of the affiant-officer's experience that drug dealers ordinarily keep their supply, records and monetary profits at home.")

This kind of intuition came up in the Supreme Court's oral argument in Riley v. California. The justices wanted to know why it would make a difference to require a warrant to search a cellphone incident to arrest. Given that cellphones store so much evidence, several justices wanted to know, won't getting a warrant be pretty easy whenever there is probable cause to make the arrest? Consider this exchange with the chief justice:

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  The point you make elsewhere in your brief and argument is that the cell phone or the smartphone has everything.
MR. FISHER:  Right.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's got the person's whole life. Well, if you're arresting somebody on the grounds of suspicion that he's a gang member and you have evidence to support that, what part of the smartphone is not likely to have pertinent evidence? What application is not? I mean, here you've got pictures, you've got videos, you've got calls.

The SJC's response, if I am reading it correctly, is that it is interpreting probable cause to make sure that probable cause doesn't exist in the routine case. To protect privacy, the court is demanding stronger probable cause. And if the phone were a smart phone with a greater likelihood of evidence on the phone, the court would be even more concerned (and, I take the implication to be, perhaps require even more cause).

If my reading is correct, however, I think it's a bit backward. As I have often written, the massive storage capacity of electronic storage devices raises special privacy concerns that should require some different Fourth Amendment rules. But I don't think it makes sense to say that the more stuff there is on the phone, the harder it should be to establish probable cause to search it. A more modern phone means a greater likelihood of evidence being found inside it. That should mean it's easier to establish probable cause, not that it's harder. The better response to the massive storage capacity of computers is use restrictions on nonresponsive data, not a higher probable cause standard.

mainfeed?d=yIl2AUoC8zA mainfeed?d=qj6IDK7rITs
--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

Shiftless in Seattle: Lawmakers Pass Onerous New Scheduling Ordinance

 

by Christian Britschgi

Reason.com Full Feed / 2016-09-29 09:34

Munitions workersThe Seattle City Council last Monday passed a sweeping "secure scheduling" ordinance by a unanimous vote, making it only the second city in the nation to take a direct role in regulating how businesses set employee schedules.

Under the new ordinance—effective July 1, 2017—certain employers will be required to tell their workers two weeks in advance which shifts they will be working.

Should an employee be called in for extra hours, say, to replace a sick co-worker, the employer will have to pay him added "predictability pay." Should an employee be sent home early—maybe because business is slow or a delivery is late—the employer must compensate him for half the hours he was scheduled to work.

In addition, on-call staff will earn half pay for shifts when they are not called into work, while those employees that have less than 10 hours between two shifts will receive time and a half. Managers will also be required to offer any additional hours to current employees before taking on new hires.

The stated purpose of the ordinance—aside from creating more predictable schedules—is to provide employees with "secure incomes" by ensuring them adequate hours.

Not getting as much work as they would like is a source of frustration for many Seattle workers. In a recent study commissioned by the city, some 30 percent of workers reported wanting more hours, and 10 percent reported difficulty in paying bills due to a lack of hours.

Helping eager employees work more and earn more is a laudable goal for the Seattle City Council. It is also a bizarre one, given how many disincentives it has created to businesses giving employees extra hours.

In 2012 Seattle passed a bill requiring businesses to provide one hour of sick leave for every 40 hours an employee works, raising the hourly cost of each worker. Then in 2015, the city passed its notorious $15-an-hour minimum wage law, raising that hourly cost still further. Indeed, a July study put out by the University of Washington (UW) found that the mandated wage increase has led to fewer hours worked per-employee and slightly less overall employment for Seattle's lowest-paid workers, compared to similar earners in other parts of the state.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) also bears some of the blame for the lack of hours, says John Vigdora, the UW economist who authored the July study on the city's new wage floor. Many employees have found their hours cut by employers looking to avoid the employer-provided-insurance mandate in the ACA, which kicks in only when someone works hours over a certain threshold, he explains.

Whether the new scheduling regulation will help workers get these hours back remains an open question, and Vigdor speculates that employers that are particularly concerned with their level of customer service may choose to absorb the costs of the new law, maintaining current staffing levels. Businesses in a more precarious financial situation, on the other hand, or less reliant on offering good customer service, are likely to respond by cutting hours.

In San Francisco—the only other city to adopt secure scheduling legislation—many businesses have indeed cut back on staff. A study conducted six months after the law went into effect found that "in response to the ordinance, 1 in 5 surveyed businesses had cut back on the number of part-time hires, and a similar number were scheduling fewer employees per shift," according to the San Francisco Chronicle.

Reason queried each member of the Seattle City Council on whether they thought Seattle businesses might behave similiarly. Tim Burgess and Mike O'Brian declined to comment; the rest did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

“Patents are bulls–t,” says Newegg Chief Legal Officer Lee Cheng

 

by Annalee Newitz

Ars Technica / 2016-09-29 15:22

reader comments 63
Share this story

Lee Cheng is one of the few attorneys to fight back against patent trolls and prevail. And at the latest Ars Live event, we talked to him about his most famous case, how people can fight patent trolls today, and what the future of patent abuse will look like in coming decades. His answers, as expected, were incredibly candid and hilarious.

In 2007, a patent troll known as Soverain had already gotten millions of dollars out of The Gap and Amazon for their online shopping cart patent when they hit Newegg with a suit. Cheng's colleagues in the legal community said you'd better just pay up—this patent is legit. Cheng didn't see it that way. Newegg had just reached a billion in sales, and he thought this piece of litigation would be the first of many lawsuits brought by companies that wanted a piece of Newegg's success. And sure enough, soon after the shopping cart claim, Newegg was hit with patent claims on several aspects of online search. Cheng decided he wasn't going to lie down and take it. He thought he could win on appeal if he could just make it through the courts in the Eastern District of Texas, where 40 percent of patent infringement claims are brought.

"I looked at the numbers, and you know the typical patent troll strategy is to say, 'You know how much money it's going to cost you to fight a case? Two to $6 million. We're only asking for $3 million... give us the money and we'll go away,'" he said. "I looked at it differently. [I said if] I can control legal costs... by doing as much work myself and with my team, this is a cost that's spread out over three to five years. That's how long a lawsuit takes."

When Cheng put it that way to his employers, they decided the money was worth it. If Cheng's strategy worked, they would never have to deal with patent trolls again. "It was obvious there was a scam going on, and someone needed to say no," he recalled.

Cheng explained the Eastern District of Texas, where there's one courtroom in Marshall, Texas, that gets 25 percent of all patent cases filed in the US. He noted there have been theories about why so many cases go to Marshall, involving "certain retired federal judges viewing themselves as stewards/godfathers of the local economy... but that's speculation." "Still," Cheng said, "federal judges have a huge amount of discretion setting rules in their courts, and they created certain rules heavily in favor of plaintiffs." One such rule requires both parties to provide "everything relevant" during discovery. This "disfavors defendants" because the trolls are usually "shell companies" who have very little paperwork to show. Meanwhile, the legitimate entrepreneurs and businesses who are the defendants have an incredibly expensive process to go through, often with years of documents to comb through.

Plus, Cheng said, being in East Texas gave the plaintiffs a chance to "play race cards." He recalled an attorney describing Newegg as "a Chinese company" in court, despite the fact that it is based in the US, because many of Newegg's executives are Chinese-American. As he told the story, Cheng recalled thinking to himself, "'Fuck you... we are proudly American, because in this great country anyone from around the world can be American'... I told the jury we're based in California and our profits are made in America and we proudly employ 1,000 Americans. And they got it. That was the one trial we won."

Why was Newegg willing to stand up to patent trolls, against all odds, when bigger companies wouldn't? Cheng believes much of it has to do with fearing risk, especially when the companies are publicly traded and answerable to shareholders. There were also concerns that plaintiffs could simply shut the defendant's business down. Until the 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, plaintiffs could get immediate injunctive relief that forced the defendant from using any technology described in the patent at issue. That would mean, for example, that Soverain could have prevented Newegg from using online shopping carts until the case was decided.

Though there has been a lot of reform around patent lawsuits, both in the courts and Congress, Cheng warned that he "has it on good authority from patent trolls that they are planning to jump back into the fray." He said that you have to look at patent abuse and trolling as an industry, and recent reforms mean "the mid market has been wiped out." So trolls are focusing on "big game cases like going after Google or Apple for large amounts of money," Cheng said. "They go after international companies, too, which often settle—especially in East Texas." On the other side are "nuisance trolls filing hundreds of lawsuits, asking for small amounts from each defendant." He called the latter especially dangerous because they're going after smaller businesses that don't have the budget to fight over $25,000-$100,000 claims.

Cheng recommended that small businesses hit by these kinds of trolls "organize all the defendants together." He suggested that groups of defendants can "create a defense war chest" and fight the trolls that way, by paying half of what they would to the patent holder. "It's hard though because someone has to make the 50 or 25 phone calls [to the other defendants]," he admitted. Plus, "the problem is that most companies call their outside counsel" instead of having an in-house lawyer who can help them work with other defendants. Still, Cheng believes the best option for a defendant who wants to fight trolls is to organize with other defendants and share costs.

During the question-and-answer period, Cheng talked more about how lawyers and entrepreneurs can challenge bad patents. He also had some choice words for patent trolls and abusers, singling out Qualcomm as a particularly grave offender. Ultimately, he worried that the litigation landscape around patents stifles innovation: "At a certain time, will we have a country that can build another Golden Gate Bridge? Or are the lawyers and regulators going to kill everything?"

Cheng said the possibilities of patent trolling make him fear for the future of this republic. And with stakes like that, the question of fight or flight becomes an easy one.

You can watch previous episodes of Ars Technica Live here. Be sure to join us in October for another episode of Ars Technica Live, filmed at Longitude in Oakland, California, with guest Ariel Waldman. She's the founder of Spacehack and has served as a consultant to the US government on human spaceflight. Waldman will talk to us about what it's like in space and how we'll get there.

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPad

FBI, DOJ And Their Forensic Scientists State They'll Continue Using Discredited Junk Science To Put People Behind Bars

 

by Tim Cushing

Techdirt. / 2016-09-29 17:20

For dozens of years, criminal prosecutions have relied on junk science. Forensic science, properly applied, can actually provide matches that identify suspects. But it's not properly applied. In the hands of the DOJ, forensic evidence examination is a closed loop. Outside scientists have been granted access to the DOJ's DNA work, but everything else -- from fingerprints to hair samples -- has been locked away in the government's database.

Still, the DOJ insists its science is solid, something it bases on confirmation bias. The matches determined in its forensic labs are "scientifically certain" because the DOJ's expert witnesses have said so in court. Not only are outside scientists locked out of examining evidence and forensic processes, but defense lawyers are as well.

The DOJ has finally decided to dial back its "scientific certainty" a bit by issuing guidance instructing its experts to not make this claim in court. This follows years of bogus matches being presented as sure things by forensic experts in court, leading to an unknown number of false convictions. This step back is a step forward for an agency that is mostly unwilling to admit to any mistakes or wrongdoing.

This small change is likely due to a damning report [PDF] issued by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) that asserts that the "scientifically certain" evidence prosecutors rely on is severely flawed.

The questions that DNA analysis had raised about the scientific validity of traditional forensic disciplines and testimony based on them led, naturally, to increased efforts to test empirically the reliability of the methods that those disciplines employed. Relevant studies that followed included:

• a 2002 FBI re-examination of microscopic hair comparisons the agency's scientists had performed in criminal cases, in which DNA testing revealed that 11 percent of hair samples found to match microscopically actually came from different individuals;

• a 2004 National Research Council report, commissioned by the FBI, on bullet-lead evidence, which found that there was insufficient research and data to support drawing a definitive connection between two bullets based on compositional similarity of the lead they contain;

• a 2005 report of an international committee established by the FBI to review the use of latent fingerprint evidence in the case of a terrorist bombing in Spain, in which the committee found that "confirmation bias"—the inclination to confirm a suspicion based on other grounds—contributed to a misidentification and improper detention; and

• studies reported in 2009 and 2010 on bitemark evidence, which found that current procedures for comparing bitemarks are unable to reliably exclude or include a suspect as a potential biter.

Beyond these kinds of shortfalls with respect to "reliable methods" in forensic feature-comparison disciplines, reviews have found that expert witnesses have often overstated the probative value of their evidence, going far beyond what the relevant science can justify. Examiners have sometimes testified, for example, that their conclusions are "100 percent certain;" or have "zero," "essentially zero," or "negligible," error rate. As many reviews—including the highly regarded 2009 National Research Council study—have noted, however, such statements are not scientifically defensible: all laboratory tests and feature-comparison analyses have non-zero error rates.

Despite these conclusions, law enforcement forensic scientists, along with the FBI and DOJ are promising to continue using junk science to convict people. The Attorney General's response to the report is basically, "Thanks for all the hard work, but we're not changing a thing."

In a statement reported by the Wall Street Journal, Attorney General Loretta Lynch said that the agency remains "confident that, when used properly, forensic science evidence helps juries identify the guilty and clear the innocent, and the department believes that the current legal standards regarding the admissibility of forensic evidence are based on sound science and sound legal reasoning." As such, she said, while "we appreciate their contribution to the field of scientific inquiry, the department will not be adopting the recommendations related to the admissibility of forensic science evidence."

The FBI's response [PDF] is no more enthusiastic. Its one-page blast claims the entire PCAST report is flawed. It also asserts there are "multiple studies" that back up its forensics work. However, the FBI turned down an invitation to participate in the PCAST study and one of the PCAST members points out that the studies the FBI claims contradict the PCAST findings actually do no such thing.

Asked about the FBI's complaints, Eric Lander, co-chair of the presidential council and president and founding member of the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard, a biomedical research group, told The Intercept that the FBI is mistaken. "Neither report says that proficiency testing be used to estimate the 'error rate' of forensic methods," he wrote in an email, and both reports agree that examiners should be subject to proficiency tests. And Lander said he is "not aware" of what studies the FBI believes were ignored by the report. "We specifically received FBI's input on studies to consider and we did so."

[...]

Lander wrote that the presidential council did in fact review the six studies the FBI complains that it missed. "However, these studies are clearly not empirical studies 'providing support for foundational validity,'" he wrote. "Indeed, only one of the papers even reports an empirical study of current forensic method at all!"

But the most defensive response [PDF] to the PCAST study has come from the American Congress of Forensic Science Laboratories. Unsurprisingly, the group isn't pleased that its conclusions and methodology have been questioned. Before addressing the shortcomings it feels the study contains, the ACFSL first tries to claim the whole thing is just a politically-motivated attack on the good people in law enforcement.

Interestingly, the PCAST report comes during a presidential administration that has demonstrated a deep sensitivity to the needs and demands of trial attorneys, criminal defendants, and advocates of sweeping criminal justice reform. Future administrations may take a different approach, tending to champion positions traditionally held by police and prosecutors. We have no opinion in these matters. But these swings in ideological perspective cause commensurate changes in how forensic science and its role in our criminal justice system are perceived. In the current political climate, forensic science is looked upon with far more suspicion and, in some cases, disdain than would be the case in other political circumstances. And because forensic science is both expected and apt to remain independent of these political currents, it is vulnerable to being misportrayed and even bullied in a way that compromises its occupational stability.

It's somewhat interesting that a field where evidence has been used to deprive innocent people of their freedom -- and whose courtroom assertions are treated as nearly-unassailable despite a long history of uncorrected errors -- can somehow be bullied by a report both the DOJ and FBI have already indicated they're going to ignore.

It also attacks some of the contributors for their work with the Innocence Project (Eric Lander) and their previous assertions about the intrusiveness of DNA collections (Tania Simoncelli) -- all the while claiming it has no interest in "disparaging" the authors of the study. Even in this, the forensic scientists' sample size is way too small. Attacking Lander for his Innocence Project work conveniently overlooks his considerable contributions to the scientific community.

[Innocence Project's Chris] Fabricant said the congress' assertions were absurd. "To suggest that the leading scientists in the country would cash in their credibility to do – what? What possible agenda could they be pursuing except scientific validity?" he asked. "I'd like to know what agenda they propose is being driven, and how somebody like Eric Lander – who mapped the human genome — is going to preside over a process that is intended to undermine the criminal justice."

These responses indicate business -- as lousy and inaccurate as it is -- will continue as usual until the DOJ is forced to confront these issues, either by litigation or legislation. Not exactly heartening news for citizens who don't like being locked up for crimes they didn't commit.



Permalink | Comments | Email This Story
--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPhone

Goldman Says OPEC Deal May Add Up To $10 To Price Of Oil, Two Days After Cutting Oil Price Target By $7

 

by Tyler Durden

Zero Hedge / 2016-09-29 07:56

Goldman has done it again. Two days after the central banker-incubator cut its year end price target from $50 to $43, admitting the previously anticipated rebalancing will take longer to achieve, and now expects "a global surplus of 400 kb/d in 4Q16 vs. a 300 kb/d draw previously", and followed the next day by a report in which it said that not even an OPEC deal would stop oil going lower, overnight the very same analyst, just 24 hours after saying the opposite, Goldman's Damien Courvalin said that the OPEC agreement will "likely provide support to prices, at least in the short term" and added that the announced production quota should boost the price of oil by $7/bbl - $10/bbl. Again: this is two days after cutting the 2016 price target by $7, and one day after saying an OPEC deal would have no impact.

Still, trying to avoid looking like a total flip-flopper, Courvalin adds that "at the historical average 4.8% production beat relative to quotas, this target would be 33.7 mb/d, above current production levels. It has historically taken a fall in oil demand to ensure quota compliance, as in that case, production is forced lower by a decline in refinery intake around the world. This is not the case today with resilient demand growth" and said that "we maintain our year-end $43/bbl and 2017 $53/bbl WTI price forecasts given: (1) uncertainty on this proposal until it is ratified, (2) likely quota beats if ratified, (3) potential for production above our cautious forecasts in areas of disruptions (as was the case today in Libya and KRG), and (4) our conservative supply forecasts outside of OPEC for next year."

Then again, the only thing that will be stuck in algos' random access memory is that Goldman now expects oil to rebound by up to $10/bbl, which may explain why oil is now rolling over.

Here is Goldman's full note for those who care:

OPEC buys time

OPEC members agreed to limit output today, although no quotas were formally set. This agreement is the first since the oil bear market started in 2014 and as such will likely provide support to prices, at least in the short term. However, we maintain our year-end $43/bbl and 2017 $53/bbl WTI price forecasts given: (1) uncertainty on this proposal until it is ratified, (2) likely quota beats if ratified, (3) potential for production above our cautious forecasts in areas of disruptions (as was the case today in Libya and KRG), and (4) our conservative supply forecasts outside of OPEC for next year.

OPEC members agreed today in Algiers to reduce production to a range of 32.5 to 33.0 mb/d, down from 33.2 mb/d in August (based on OPEC secondary sources). As of now there are no further details and the agreement is scheduled to be ratified at OPEC's next official meeting on November 30. This agreement is the first since the oil bear market started in 2014 and as such will likely provide support to prices, at least in the short term. However uncertainty is set to remain high in coming months, with so far no comments from the Saudi minister. Further, the Iraq minister commented that secondary sources for oil production are too low, with his country's output potentially 300 kb/d higher than such measure implies, a gap of nearly half of the proposed production cut.

If this deal follows the proposal made by Algeria as reported by Bloomberg this morning, it would leave Libya and Nigeria exempt, feature a production target for Saudi Arabia, allow for some growth in Iran and Venezuela and require a 1.6% production cut elsewhere relative to average January-August production levels.

Through 2017, such a proposal would keep production 480 to 980 kb/d on average below our forecast. Strictly implemented in 1H17 and all else constant, the production quotas announced today should be worth $7/bbl to $10/bbl to the oil price. However, at the historical average 4.8% production beat relative to quotas, this target would be 33.7 mb/d, above current production levels. It has historically taken a fall in oil demand to ensure quota compliance, as in that case, production is forced lower by a decline in refinery intake around the world. This is not the case today with resilient demand growth.

We reiterate our year-end $43/bbl and 2017 $53/bbl forecasts given: (1) uncertainty on this proposal until it is ratified especially as it relates to Saudi cuts and Iran caps, (2) likely quota beats if ratified, (3) upside surprises to disrupted production as announced today (Libya, KRG) with potential for more given our cautious forecasts in these countries, and (4) our conservative supply forecasts outside of OPEC for next year. Since we see risks to production from countries not targeted by today's quota as skewed to the upside, we view a strict implementation of today's OPEC proposal as normalizing the risks around our projected price path.

  • Today's proposal does not impact our expectation for weaker fundamentals in the coming months: (1) the deal does not impact current production as it is scheduled to be finalized at the November 30 meeting, and (2) we learned today that production in Libya/Iraq is currently 180 kb/d above our expectation.
  • Longer term, we remain skeptical on the implementation of the proposed quotas, if ratified. Strict implementation of today's deal in 2017 would represent 480 to 980 kb/d less output than we forecast. However, our forecasts assume little reversal in the c.1.0 mb/d of short-term disrupted production, with recent data for these countries already putting that forecast at risk. Further, we have remained cautious on the delivery of new projects outside of OPEC next year, with a combined 400 kb/d lower forecast vs. guided deliveries. The net of all these risks is close to zero, on our estimates, instead of skewed to higher production before today's quota announcement. As a result, we reiterate our $43/bbl year-end forecast as well as our $53/bbl for next year.
  • Our conviction that OPEC production cuts will be ineffective long term is rooted in our view that the flattening of the oil cost curve created by shale will lead to a loss of pricing power by low-cost producers, leaving them with only volume growth to sustain fiscal revenues. As a result, if this proposed cut is strictly enforced and supports prices, we would expect it to prove self defeating medium term with a large drilling response around the world. This is what occurred following the January 1987 OPEC production cut which led to a rebound in non-OPEC onshore rigs before prices sold off again setting the stage for a decade long steady increase in OPEC drilling.

Exhibit 1: No formal proposal has been announced except for a headline production level. The below table illustrates the proposal made by Algeria ahead of the meeting.
Crude oil production (thousand barrels per day)
gs%20table%20oil_0.png

 

Exhibit 2: Compliance to quotas is historically poor, especially when oil demand is not weak
OPEC production of countries under quota vs. their production target (lhs); Year-over-year change in global oil demand (rhs). In thousand barrels per day
GS%20compliance_0.png

--

Shared via Inoreader



Sent from my iPhone